Tsunami relief

Improving the Effectiveness of Tsunami Relief Efforts: A Concept Paper

 

Doug Koplow, Earth Track, Cambridge, MA
Version: Jan. 10, 2005

 

(Comments and suggestions encouraged: earth_track@yahoo.com)

This paper proposes two changes that I believe will make Tsunami relief efforts more effective. The first moves the detailed logistics system of the UN relief coordinator into the public domain. The objective of this change is to establish increased ability for outside groups to provide technology and data; to ensure more rapid access to updated information for all working in the region; and for increasing donor confidence in how the relief effort is being run. The second change increases the amount and quality of information collected on pledges and establishes a more formal tracking of pledge fulfillment and application.

While the dollar value of pledges from around the world continues to rise, this is only one critical-path item in the relief. The UN estimates that 5 million people in South East Asia are without basic services. Disease risks are high, compounding the lack of back necessities and severe trauma the affected population faces. Tens of thousands of lives rest on effective deployment of aid in the coming weeks and months. Within the United States, former presidents Bill Clinton and George H.W. Bush provide an extremely high-profile face on continued fundraising for disaster. It is my hope that they will also work to improve the organization of relief efforts.

1) Moving relief logistics data system from UN offices to the internet.

Current relief coordination is being conducted primarily by the UN's Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and by the US military (which has been doing much of the supply distribution immediately following the disaster). Logistical support is being provided by the UN Joint Logistics Centre. Some information on the relief operations, including on assets being made available, condition of infrastructure, information on missing persons, and some logistics maps are being made public. However, this information still tends to be fairly general in nature, more of an electronic bulletin board than a full-fledged planning support tool. Information on the site is not geo-coded or linked in such a way that would enable third parties to quickly assess visually where assets/bottlenecks are, the range of these assets, or other factors that would be important in making operational decisions. While there are maps on the system, these are static pictures of maps created elsewhere.

Given the geographic and humanitarian scope of the challenge, it is likely that existing UN logistics systems will prove insufficient to the immense task at hand. A related risk is that technical capacity in the system will not be matched by sufficient staff or ground access so as to provide a rich, real-time flow of information on constraints and assets in the relief areas. The US military has state-of-the art logistics capabilities. Nonetheless, it also faces constraints in being able to gather and integrate site-specific data on health and disease; infrastructure conditions; vulnerable or inaccessible population groups; and so forth. Creating an open and integrated logistics infrastructure would greatly improve the likelihood of achieving more positive outcomes on the relief effort.

Here are my proposed changes:

a) Integration and publication. Make internal logistics systems publicly-accessible in terms of viewing rights. Some information might continue to be restricted, or delayed, due to security concerns, but this should be a small amount. The public system would be the primary data source that all parties use to analyze the damage and ground conditions, and to plan and coordinate relief operations. Data sets would be spatially-oriented, supplemented by additional data layers as appropriate on disease vectors or outbreaks, land mine locations, infrastructure condition, and access bottlenecks. The public data source would integrate key information now maintained in separate locations by OCHA, the US government or military, other governments, international aid agencies, and digital mapping firms such as ESRI and Digital Globe. Both ESRI and Digital Globe have already contributed materials to support tsunami relief, but it is unclear if all of these contributions have been integrated into a single resource accessible by all parties involved in the relief effort.

b) Specialization. Spatial data systems facilitate data upgrading and integration by specialist groups. In my proposal, key areas could be supported by formal or informal working groups, linked via the internet. These groups would help structure information on their areas of expertise in useful ways. Some might be able to conduct data modeling as well. For example, it may be possible to analyze prior mine field positions, wave direction, and some new findings regarding mine location to identify new areas likely to be high risk. Similar work in the area of disease vectors and risk is likely already ongoing. The Open GIS Consortium seems to have some experience in collaborate geographic data development, and may be a good partner here. They also represent all of the large spatial data firms and would be valuable in engaging the skills of these firms..

Organizations specializing in disease mapping (such as the Centers for Disease Control), or on optimizing transport logistics (such as FedEx or UPS), may find it easier to contribute needed expertise to an open system such as this.

Internet blogs are increasingly valuable tools for integrating disparate information from public sources and individuals; and for providing rapid feedback on ideas and fact-checking of claims. They have already been a valuable tool in tsunami relief (see, for example, the South-East Asia Earthquake and Tsunami blog), and can provide both input to, and critiques of, a more public relief effort.

c) Data upgrades. Specific third parties could be authorized to upgrade certain types of data within the core system. These rights can be restricted in terms of topic area or geographic location -- but can nonetheless greatly accelerate the rate at which data needed to tailor the relief operations are acquired.

d) Information dissemination. Existing outlets, such as the UN's Relief Web, may not be fast enough once the data applications move from static, educational maps to operational planning. However, private sector or governmental substitutes likely exist. The Geography Network, run by ESRI, may be one possibility. The Oracle corporation, which makes many of the databases that are powering these applications, could be another.

Of critical importance is ensuring that the affected citizens also have access to the accumulated information on damages, deaths, and rebuilding that the outside world is using. It is therefore important to establish free data-access points for citizens in affected areas so they can track how the relief is proceeding, and move from being victims to participants in the recovery of the area.

Moving the logistics challenge to the public domain would have a number of important benefits:

 

 

  • Increased confidence for donors. If donors can see the system is working, and able to identify critical paths and coordinate efforts across different groups, their confidence will rise. This is important in getting them to provide more financial and in-kind support, and to make good on pledges quickly.

 

 

  • System gaps are visible for correction. If the UN logistical coordination system is technically weak relative to standard commercial logistics applications, this will be quickly evident to outside parties. This exposure is likely the fastest way to encourage outside parties to provide upgrades or to supplement data gaps. Knowing and fixing problems early is imperative and will save lives. Upgrades will also be extremely valuable for future relief efforts. Were the system internal to the UN, outside groups would not have the knowledge or incentive to provide improvements.

 

 

  • Allows third parties to contribute data. Information from decentralized data gatherers regarding conditions on the ground can be critical in tailoring responses to save lives. Obviously there need to be procedures for certifying which groups are reliable sources for what types of data. However, creating a more decentralized way to feed information back to the central coordinating agency will lead to better information on bottlenecks, assets, and options. Specialization by type of information can also occur, facilitating quicker and more accurate upgrades. For example, particular groups could update mine location data; health care system assets; missing people information; and an assortment of criteria that support more rapid recovery.

 

 

  • Faster access for relief groups to up-to-date situation maps. An on-line database would provide important information to all parties involved in relief efforts in a form that they could use to identify places where their work would be of greatest value. Given the many different groups involved, ensuring that there is no delay between when the UN gets updated info and when the groups on the ground do is crucial.

 

 

  • Oversight on relief efficacy. Making the relief logistics information public would also provide a very important mechanism for overseeing how effectively the UN coordinator is carrying out its duties. The feedback generated would help UN staff to work more carefully, and would enable them to tap into the immense technical expertise from outside that is looking in earnest for a way to help in the effort.

 

 

  • Bottlenecks visible, subjected to more outside pressure. A public system would make relief bottlenecks more visible to the outside. This visibility makes possible increased attention and pressure from outside, of great value in overcoming the bottlenecks, be they political, logistical, or technical. In some cases, this pressure would have been politically difficult to mount from within the UN itself. Outside parties may also be able to use the information in prioritizing which actions will generate the largest returns to the overall relief effort.

2) Expand ReliefWeb tracking of financial commitments to address the timing of payments, the portion of the relief and rebuilding operation supported, and completion of pledges. The UN's Relief Web already provides updated summaries of aid pledges for tsunami relief. These summaries note the donor, the purpose of the aid, its value in US dollars, and the channel of the funding.

Aid pledges don't help much until the cash is actually delivered, and this can be a problem. According to the UK's Guardian newspaper, $1.1 billion in pledges for the Bam earthquake in Iran last year netted only $17.5 million in actual pledges paid, a 1.6% fulfillment rate. Collection rates for other disasters have been somewhat better (30-50% of pledges), but shameful nonetheless.

A second challenge for relief efforts is ensuring that funds are available for support and rebuilding beyond the initial crisis period, when needs remain on the ground but public attention has focused elsewhere.

The following changes could help address these problems:

a) Publish more detailed information on pledges on the web. OCHA should have a formal, web-accessible database of aid pledges. These should list not only the country, but the specific agency and authorizing agreement granting the aid. It may be helpful to post a PDF version of these agreements on the web as well. Donors should be required to provide detailed information on the timing of the aid, and any restrictions associated with it (e.g., on how it is used or when it must be used by). All of these restrictions should also be publicized. Finally, the database should show, for each commitment, the percentage fulfilled to date, highlighting payments that are past due. Payments that are late should have a separate calculation of imputed interest, calculated at the cost of capital for the relief organization. While politics may preclude actually collecting this interest, it will be a visual demonstration that payment delays do have a financial cost (as well as a humanitarian one).

b) Establish phases of relief and recovery for donors. Donations should be solicited at the outset for activities after the emergency phase. This should be clear to donors. A portion of these pledges should be paid immediately, and placed into a protected escrow account. The escrow account would protect the relief organization by helping them avoid funding shortfalls as the emergency period ends, and by reducing the non-payment risk on pledges. The escrow would also protect the donors by ensuring that the funds could not be simply absorbed into the organizations' general overheads, and that they are used for the specific emergency for which they were donated.

c) Include reductions in obligated payments (e.g., debt forgiveness or relief) as a contribution. Though this doesn't directly put cash into the relief effort, it does free up resources for the affected central governments to apply to relief. It is also important to credit the countries that are forgiving debts, as there is a direct financial cost to their citizenry. These should be classified differently in the database (so as not to inflate the expected cash resources), but do need to be recognized. It may be possible to calculate the annual government funds freed up from the debt relief, much of which could be directed to relief and reconstruction as well.

d) Develop third party oversight of pledge fulfillment. Given the continued reliance of the relief organization on outside donors, it is politically difficult for them to criticize the donors for late, or non-payment of particular pledges. However, this capability should be developed within third party NGOs, relying in part on the more extensive data collected on Relief Web. These outside organizations can link the delays to human suffering on the ground, increasing the pressure for timely and complete payment of pledges.